Previous research has suggested that false memories can prime performance on related implicit and explicit memory tasks. The present research examined whether false memories can also be used to prime higher order cognitive processes, namely, insight-based problem solving. Participants were asked to solve a number of compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem. The results showed that when the critical lure: (a) was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list and (b) was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different than when there was no DRM priming. A second experiment demonstrated that these outcomes were not a simple artifact of the inclusion of a recall test prior to the problem solving task. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the previous literature on priming and the adaptive function of false memories.
Introduction
Research has established that memory is error-prone and that these errors frequently lead to false memory illusions (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) . Such errors of commission can be studied using the Deese/ Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm where participants are given word lists (e.g., truck, bus, train, vehicle) whose members are all associates of an unpresented item or critical lure (e.g., car). Despite never having been presented, participants often falsely remember the critical lure as being presented in the list.
There is considerable evidence showing that true and false memories most often behave in very different ways (for reviews, see Brainerd, Reyna, and Ceci, 2008; Gallo, 2006) . Although these differences are many, including differences in patterns of neural activation for true and false memories (e.g., Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Donahue, Goodman, & Bunge, 2008; Weise & Daum, 2006) , there is a growing literature that also shows some similarities, at least at the behavioral level. Indeed, recent research has found that in a number of important ways false memories behave in a manner very similar to that of true memories. For example, Roediger and McDermott (1995) showed that not only do participants report a high level of confidence in their recognition of critical lures they also claim to have specifically ''remembered" the act of studying such items. Indeed, Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that participants were just as likely to give remember responses for false memories as they are for true memories. Research by Payne, Lampinen, and Cordero (1996) has also suggested that false memories show similarities to true memories, providing evidence that both true and false recall decrease under divided attention conditions.
Based on findings such as these, it might be expected that false memories exhibit other parallels with true memories. One avenue that has recently been explored concerns whether false memories can prime implicit tests of memory in the same way that true memories can. If one accepts that false memories are caused by a spreading activation mechanism (see Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) , then priming becomes an ideal area of investigation (Anderson, 1983) .
